The new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) is going to be embedded in the risk management practices at many financial institutions shortly, but the academic and financial world are still discussing about several topics related to the new capital adequacy rules. One of the most important and prominent examples among these topics is the link between loss given default (LGD) and the economic cycle. If this link exists, which is suggested by an extensive literature, the Vasicek model used in the Basel Accord does not take into account systematic correlation between probability of default (PD) and LGD and, to compensate for this deficiency, downturn LGD estimates are required to be used as an input to the model. However, often banks lack an extensive LGD data history covering a full economic cycle especially for retail assets. In this paper, we propose a simple and realistic solution that can be adopted in order to derive conservative estimates of LGD. Using data covering a set of retail loans (secured and unsecured), we investigate the relation between LGD and the credit cycle over the available period. In contrast to the extensive literature on the topic, our results show that when ultimate recoveries are used, the linkage between LGD and the credit cycle is often insignificant (e.g. for two out of three retail asset classes). This implies that the conservatism required by the supervisory authorities should not always be added to LGD estimates used to estimate banks' capital requirements.
Introduction
The Basel II Framework Document issued by the Basel Committee in June 2006 requires banks to use estimates of Loss Given Default (LGD) that reflect "economic downturn conditions" in order to be compliant with the Advanced Internal Rating Based (A-IRB) requirements. The Framework Document describes approaches to quantify these "downturn LGDs" in general terms, but deliberately leaves specific details of the quantification process for supervisors to develop in collaboration with the banking industry. The requirement that IRB banks use economic-downturn LGD is intended to ensure that Pillar I capital requirements properly reflect material systematic volatility in credit losses over time. 1 To the extent that recovery rates on defaulted exposures may be lower during economic downturn conditions than during "normal" conditions, a capital rule aimed at guaranteeing sufficient capital to cover realized losses during adverse circumstances should reflect this tendency.
Many academic papers (e.g., Izvorsky, 1997; Covitz and Han, 2005; Acharya et al., 2007) have demonstrated that negative economic cycles and high default periods carry with them higher loss-given-default expectations than if the probability of default (PD) and recovery rate variables were considered stochastic but independent. However, at the same time, these studies rarely use data about ultimate recoveries (i.e., the total amount recovered after a sufficiently long recovery period typically set equal to one or two years) and were never applied to retail portfolios. The recoveries considered in these studies were generally the ones that occur during the days immediately after the default event. However, banks need to use ultimate recoveries when estimating LGD for regulatory capital purposes and this can lead to significantly different conclusions than those reported in prior studies. (2006) is divided into three Pillars. Pillar I describes how to calculate banks' minimum capital requirements. Pillar II provides the key principles of the supervisory review process that should insure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in their business and use better risk management techniques to monitor and manage these risks. Pillar III defines a set of disclosure requirements for banks which will allow market participants to have a more complete picture of the capital adequacy of the institutions. 2 LGD is equal to (1-recovery rate).
Criteria for the quantification of LGD are described in paragraph 468 of the Framework Document. 3 These criteria specify that LGD cannot be less than the long-run default-weighted average loss given default calculated based on the average economic loss of all observed defaults within the data source for that type of facility or pool. 4 In addition, a bank must take into account the potential for the LGD of the facility/pool to be higher than the default-weighted average during a period when credit losses are substantially higher than average. However, it is also stated that for certain types of exposures, loss severities may not exhibit such cyclical variability and LGD estimates may not differ materially (or possibly at all) from the long-run default-weighted average.
In the Accord (paragraph 468), three generic methodologies to estimate downturn LGD are presented:
• averages of loss severities observed during periods of high credit losses;
• forecasts based on appropriately conservative assumptions;
• other similar methods.
The first proposal seems to be the easiest one to implement, when data is available. The problem is that LGD data is generally sparse and there is very limited industry experience with regard to LGD estimates. Downturn LGD estimation based on historical data is currently not possible for many banks because of the short time periods available (e.g., less than 3 years) or for the lack of an economic downturn during the available period.
In general, concerns have been raised by banks about how to identify and define an economic downturn. 5 Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado (2006) compare credit downturns and recession periods and show that the credit cycle is related to, but distinct from the macroeconomic cycle. This important result explains why previous studies (e.g., Gaspar and Slinko, 2005) have found that macroeconomic variables explain only a small portion in the variation of recovery rates and suggests that banks should not rely exclusively on macroeconomic variables to estimate downturn LGD.
The lack of clear guidelines on this topic can lead to very different approaches being implemented across banks and countries, and significant effects on the level of capital requirements. As many authors have shown (e.g., Saurina and Trucharte, 2004; Altman and Sabato, 2005) , Basel II Advanced-IRB capital requirements are highly sensible to LGD values in particular for retail asset classes. For this reason, a specific monitoring task has been assigned to the national supervisors in order to ensure a certain level of consistency in each country.
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The second proposal gives banks the possibility to estimate downturn LGD using forecasts based on appropriately conservative assumptions. This can be considered as an appropriate solution when historical data is not available. However, the lack of data also affects the ability of financial institutions to forecast LGD.
Linking forecasts to conservative assumptions makes this suggested methodology very similar to stress testing, where future forecasts are only based on assumptions on likely economic scenarios.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we analyze the link between recovery rates and the credit cycle for retail assets over a period of almost four years. Differently from most of the available studies on this topic, we calculate LGD using ultimate recoveries observed one year after the default event and we analyze them at regulatory asset class level (such as prescribed by Basel II). 7 In contrast with the existing literature, we find that the adverse dependencies between default rates and recovery rates are insignificant for two out of three asset classes ("small and medium sized enterprises retail asset class" and "qualified revolving exposures"). As such, we show that in many cases banks will not be obliged to calculate and apply conservative LGD parameters to estimate their capital requirements.
Second, we investigate the issue of estimating conservative LGD for retail exposures and propose a solution for the common lack of retail recoveries data to 6 We are aware of several central banks applying consistent methodologies to estimate downturn LGD at country level. However, these methodologies may differ quite significantly between countries. Considering the relevant impact of LGD on bank capital requirements, we believe that these differences may cause competitive advantages for banks as Hannan and Pilloff (2004) LGD during a period of significantly above-average default rates (i.e., downturn period). Finally, we test both approaches on data of the retail portfolio of a large international bank in order to underscore our conjectures empirically.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature on the linkage between recovery rates and the economic cycle. In Section 3, we present our approach for unsecured and secured exposures, respectively. In Section 4, we draw our conclusions.
Review of the literature
In the standard rating-based credit risk model developed by Gupton, Finger and Bhatia (1997) , it is assumed that recoveries on defaulted exposures are random outcomes, independent of the default event. A similar independence assumption is made in the models of Jarrow et al. (1997) , Kijima and Komoribayashi (1998) and in the Vasicek model (Vasicek, 2002) used in the new Basel Accord. However, if realizations of recoveries are low exactly at times when many firms default, the assumption that recoveries are independent of default rates or constant would result in an underestimation of credit risk.
There has been increasing support in the empirical literature that both PD and LGD are correlated. Frye (2000) shows that during recessions recovery is about one third lower than during expansions. In his study, he examines data on U.S. corporate bonds and finds significant synchrony between default and recovery. Frye applies a subjective 10% increase on default rates and uses a previously developed regression model to estimate recovery rates. Results show that recovery falls by 25% in absolute terms from its normal-year average. However, it is worth to remember that these results are obtained using recoveries measured few days after the default and not ultimate recoveries. Hu and Perraudin (2002) analyze the dependence between recovery rates and default rates using Moody's historical bond market data between 1971 and 2000.
Recovery rates are defined as the ratio of the market value of the bonds to the unpaid principal, one month after default, averaged across the bonds that default in a given quarter. Default rates are defined as the fraction of bonds that default in a quarter to the number of bonds rated at the start of the quarter. Having filtered the recovery data to allow for variation over time in the pool of borrowers rated by Moody's, they study simple measures of correlation between aggregate quarterly default and average recovery rates. These correlation measures suggest that recoveries tend to be low when default rates are high. Their study concludes that typical correlations for post 1982 quarters are -22%. If the period 1971-2000 is considered, typical correlations are -19%. Again, it is important to note that this study is not based on ultimate recoveries. argue that the markets for defaulted securities have limited capacity (i.e., the demand for these securities is not perfectly elastic as standard asset pricing theory would suggest). Specifically, when the supply of defaulted securities is high, they trade at lower prices. If recovery is measured as the price of a defaulted security as a fraction of par (as is standard practice when ultimate recoveries are not used), then of course this would reduce recoveries in times characterized by large default rates. Consistently, when regressing recovery rates on the aggregate default rate as an indicator of the aggregate supply of defaulted bonds, the authors find a negative relationship. However, when macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, for example, are added as additional explanatory variables, they exhibit low explanatory power for the recovery rates.
In a recent study, Acharya et al. (2007) use data on defaulted firms in the U.S.
over the period 1982-1999 to investigate whether industry-wide distress affects creditor recoveries. They show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. In line with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), they show that creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid ("fire sales" effect), particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific (i.e., not easily redeployable by other industries) and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. Acharya et al. (2007) use the prices of defaulted securities at the time of emergence from default or bankruptcy discounted up to the time of default to measure recoveries. This definition of recoveries is closer to the one of ultimate recoveries, but the interval between the default and the recoveries' measurement is still too small on average to consider them as ultimate recoveries.
Conservative LGD estimates

Economic Downturn definition
As outlined in Section 2, we have found that the definition of economic downturn may vary quite substantially from study to study. The most helpful source in order to identify an appropriate definition of downturn conditions is Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). This document helps banks to interpret paragraph 468 of the Basel Accord and describes the process that should be followed in order to asses the effects, if any, of economic downturn conditions on recovery rates. The first step describes how to identify appropriate downturn conditions.
Characteristics of economic downturns are different for retail and non-retail exposures. Wholesale portfolios are more strictly linked to the macroeconomic cycle than retail portfolios, but the credit cycle is related to, but distinct from the macroeconomic cycle (e.g., Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado, 2006) . Accordingly, periods of negative GDP and elevated unemployment rates can help to identify downturn conditions, but the effect on recoveries can be lagged.
We believe that the best approach to identify a downturn period for retail exposures is the one based on observed historical default rates. Periods in which observed historical default rates have been elevated can be associated with a downturn period for the specific portfolio. However, we see two major issues with this approach:
• which aggregation level for the exposures should be used (asset class, product, pool) and,
• which default rates should be classified as significantly above "normal" or average.
The answer to the first question is provided in Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2005) where it is stated that at a minimum, the bank should identify separate downturn conditions for each supervisory asset class. 8 However, it is also pointed out that a greater granularity in defining downturn conditions should result in more conservative LGD estimates. Indeed, the bank may identify downturn conditions at a more granular level if such an approach is more risk sensitive.
Possible solutions to the second issue are not addressed in Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2005) . Therefore, the bank needs to set internal policies to ensure a common definition of downturn conditions for each retail portfolio across the different business units. The minimum length of the period, in which observed default rates are higher than the mean rate, and the minimum distance from the mean required as to consider an observed default rate as "significantly high", should be clearly defined.
Methodologies to estimate conservative LGD
The academic and financial world have paid special attention to methodologies for calculating downturn LGD estimates during the last years. The central question is how to calculate a downturn LGD when data of an economic downturn is not available. A number of solutions with large differences in the level of complexity have been proposed. However, the first issue to be addressed is whether it is really necessary to estimate a downturn LGD or whether the long-run default-weighted average LGD is sufficient.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) states that the LGD estimates may be based on long-run default-weighted average loss rates if no material adverse dependencies between default rates and recovery rates have been identified. Hence, downturn LGD has to be estimated only for portfolios (or asset classes) for which a significant correlation between default rates and recovery rates has been found. Consequently, at the outset possible adverse dependencies (i.e., high negative correlation) between default rates and recovery rates have to be identified.
While the appropriate significance level of the correlations may be open to discussion, it is conventional to consider a correlation higher than (+/-) 10% to be significant.
Once the asset classes for which downturn LGD needs to be estimated are identified, the next step is to choose the methodology to be used for calculating
LGD estimates which are consistent with downturn conditions. The existing An alternative approach is proposed by Miu and Ozdemir (2005) . They analyze the possibility of estimating downturn LGD by incorporating the observed correlation between PD and LGD. In this way, they correct the actual LGD estimates by adding a cyclical ingredient. Their study shows that even at a moderate level of the PD/LGD-correlation, the average LGD increases by about 37%. It is important to point out that they find a lower mark-up for secured loans than for unsecured. for each supervisory asset class (or product) and calculate the shift during the stressed scenario. Then, using the correlation to correct the estimated default rate shift, we can calculate the shift that LGD would experience during a period of higher default rates (economic downturn). The underlying idea is that if we can observe how PD and LGD move together (by estimating their historical correlation),
we can predict the effect that an increase in default rates would have on LGD.
Accordingly, if a negative correlation is found, there will be no need to estimate a downturn value for the loss given default.
We are aware that the correlation between PD and LGD is likely to be higher during downturn periods. However, lacking appropriate data, we neglect the potential effect that downturn periods may have on the PD/LGD-correlation. This shortcoming of our dataset is mitigated by the fact that retail products have a low correlation with the business cycle.
We use data on retail loans over the period from July 2002 to March 2007 and calculate default rates (PD) and LGD for 12 one-year periods. For each consecutive period, we have 9 months overlapping with the previous period (see Table 1 ). If default rates and recovery rates are correlated, we expect to observe a higher
LGD in the periods with higher default rates and the opposite. We calculate the correlation between the PD and LGD observations over the 12 available periods. In addition, we calculate the average PD and standard deviation during the complete time interval (about four years). Then, we stress the PD to estimate the percentage increase that would be experienced during a stressed scenario. We define this percentage as PD stressing factor. We estimate the LGD stressing factor by multiplying the PD stressing factor by the PD/LGD correlation:
( 1) where n is the number of observations and σ is the standard deviation of the observed default rates. Hence, the PD stressing factor is equal to the average PD plus one standard deviation divided by the average PD. The LGD stressing factor is obtained by multiplying the PD stressing factor by the correlation between PD and
LGD (ρ PD/LGD ):
11 See Appendix A for more details on LGD estimation. 12 However, we split the "Other Retail" asset class (ORE) between private individuals (ORE-PI) and small and medium sized enterprises (ORE-SME), considering the significant difference in the risk profile of these clients.
The results of the analysis show a high and positive correlation of 0.77 for ORE-PI and a negative correlation for ORE-SME (-0.12) as well as Qualified
Revolving Exposures (QRE) (-0.84), suggesting that the latter two classes do not need a downturn LGD (see Figure 2 ).
Applying the approach described before and using a stress scenario with one standard deviation added to the mean, we find a PD stressing factor of 33%. This factor needs to be multiplied by 0.77 (PD/LGD correlation for the ORE-PI asset class) in order to calculate the LGD stressing factor (26%). Finally, we find an average increase in the one-year LGD for the entire class of 17%. 13 This factor should be added to each one-year product LGD within the ORE-PI class in order to calculate the product/pool level downturn LGD.
To avoid the possibility of getting a LGD higher than 100% and to ensure a larger increase for lower LGDs (where the biggest shift can be expected in case of a downturn), we propose the following formula:
where:
DLGD= downturn LGD ASAC= average expected LGD increase for the asset class ELGD= long-run defaulted weighted average per pool
This formula for the selected ORE-PI portfolio equals:
DLGD= 0.17+ (0.83*ELGD)
Figure 2. PD and LGD correlation per asset class
This figure shows the PD and LGD distribution over the 12 consecutive periods that have been used for the analysis. The graphs present the retail asset classes, i.e., Other retail (divided into PI and SME) and Qualified revolving exposures.
Figure 3. Expected versus Downturn LGD for ORE-PI asset class
This figure shows the relation between the expected and the downturn LGD based on the formula proposed in this paper for the analyzed ORE-PI asset class. On the x-axis, the expected LGD (i.e., long-run default-weighted average LGD) of the ORE-PI is shown. On the y-axis, the Downturn LGD for the ORE-PI asset class is calculated as DLGD= 0.17 + (0.83*ELGD). LGD P D LGD Figure 3 shows that the downturn LGD distribution resulting from this approach looks similar to the one proposed by the US regulator. However, in contrast to the approach proposed in the "Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework", our approach relies on empirical analyses and provides a different formula for each asset class or facility. Moreover, our approach allows banks to re-estimate periodically the DLGD formula in order to incorporate changes in the credit cycle and the resulting effects on the PD/LGD-correlation or the standard deviation of the PD.
Secured exposures
For secured exposures, our approach takes into account the two main drivers (i.e., cure rate and collateral value) that are expected to affect the LGD during a downturn period. We test this approach on a Dutch mortgage portfolio using a sample of approximately 90,000 currently open mortgage contracts. 14 In order to divide our sample into risk-homogeneous pools, we use the Loan To Value (LTV) variable that is calculated and available for each contract. 15 Moreover, we have data on the indexed execution value of the collateral, the exposure, and the current LGD segment.
We define the cure rate as the number of defaulted clients (i.e., over 90 days past due) that pay back their debt divided by the total number of clients in default over a one year period. The cure rate is expected to decrease during a downturn and consequently the average LGD to increase.
After performing a sensitivity analysis with different stressing factors (between 5% and 50 %), we apply a subjective stressing factor (10%) to the cure rate excluding the selected percentage (10%) of self-cure clients from the development sample. 16 We perform this stress testing analysis per LTV band as shown in Table 2. 14 We exclude the government fully guaranteed loans from the sample. 15 The Loan To Value variable is calculated by dividing the loan by the value of the house. The higher the LTV, the riskier the mortgage is considered (i.e., the higher PD and LGD). 16 The cure rate stressing factor can also be obtained empirically by analyzing the relation between PD and cure rate. In our limited database, we were unable to uncover the expected negative correlation between PD and cure rate. Therefore, we have tested different subjective stressing factors between 5% and 50% and we have selected the most appropriate one (10%) based on our expectations.
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A c t u a l S t r e s s e d s i t u a t i o n
In order to stress test the collateral value, we calculate the yearly average growth rate and standard deviation of the NVM (Dutch Union of Real Estate Brokers) house-price index over the past 38 years . The growth rates are displayed in Figure 4 . This figure shows the growth rate of the house price index over the past 38 years in the Netherlands. The data source is the Dutch Union of Real Estate Brokers.
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-10,00% 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Year Growth % Average 6,37 % Standard Deviation 9.32 % Using the observed average growth rate (6.37%) and standard deviation (9.32%), we create six stress test scenarios. Assuming that house prices follow a normal distribution, we assign to each scenario its expected probability. For each stress scenario, we calculate the expected house prices growth rate as:
Expected Growth Rate= Average growth rate-X*standard deviation (4) where X depends on how severe the economic downturn is expected to be (e.g., between 0.5 and 3). The results from this analysis are reported in Table 3 . Table 3 .
Stress testing scenarios for house prices growth in the Netherlands
The first column of the table reports the multiplier of the observed standard deviation (9.32%), the second column the expected growth in house prices, and the third column the expected probability associated with each scenario under the assumption of normally distributed house prices.
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During an economic downturn the value of the collateral (i.e., real estate prices in this case) is likely to decrease. 17 If the value of the collateral decreases, the LTV will increase and, at the portfolio level, a certain number of clients will migrate to a higher LTV band (see Table 4 ). Therefore, by observing the migration in the LTV distribution associated with the simulated stress scenario, we can calculate the new stressed average LGD. We define this as "migration effect". We calculate the final LGD stressing factor by comparing the two average
LGDs presented at the bottom of Table 4 (4.52% and 6.62%). Specifically, we calculate the LGD stressing factor by dividing the difference between average stressed and unstressed LGD by the unstressed LGD (i.e., 2.1%/4.52% = 47%). This
LGD stressing factor will be applied to every pool or facility in the secured portfolio in order to calculate the final downturn LGD as Downturn LGD= (1+Z)* average LGD,
where Z is the final LGD stressing factor (i.e., 47% in our study).
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Conclusions
In this study, we analyze the issue of estimating a conservative loss given default for retail assets as prescribed by the new Basel Capital Accord. Banks that will implement the Advanced IRB approach will need to estimate a downturn LGD to calculate their regulatory capital. However, we have found that a commonly accepted methodology to estimate the appropriate conservatism to be added to the average LGD is still lacking.
In terms of contribution to the literature, and to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the link between recoveries and the credit cycle for retail assets, to investigate the issue of estimating conservative LGD for retail exposures and to propose a solution for the common lack of retail recoveries data to cover a full credit cycle (including an economic downturn).
We update the existing literature in two ways. First, we analyze the link between recovery rates and the credit cycle for retail assets over a period of almost four years. Differently from most of the available studies on this topic, we calculate
LGD using ultimate recoveries observed one year after the default event and we analyze them at regulatory asset class level. In contrast with the existing literature, we find that the adverse dependencies between default rates and recovery rates are not present in all asset classes. As such, our results suggest that in several cases banks will not be obliged to calculate and apply conservative LGD parameters to estimate their capital requirements.
Second, we investigate the issue of estimating conservative LGD for retail exposures and propose a solution for the common lack of retail recoveries data to cover a full credit cycle (including an economic downturn). Specifically, considering the significant impact of a collateral on the LGD value, two different techniques are proposed for secured and unsecured exposures. For the former, we stress the value of the collateral and the cure rate in order to find the expected increase of the LGD in a downturn period. For the latter instead, we use the existing correlation between default rates and recovery rates, if any, to quantify the amount of conservatism to be added to the LGD during a period of default rates significantly higher than the mean (i.e., downturn period). Finally, we test both approaches on data of the retail portfolio of a large international bank in order to underscore our conjectures empirically.
The methodology proposed in this paper is based on an empirical analysis and provides a specific formula for each asset class or facility. Moreover, the proposed approach allows banks to re-estimate periodically the DLGD formula in order to incorporate changes in the PD/LGD-correlation and the standard deviation of PD.
Considering the importance of the LGD in the Basel II Advanced IRB approach, we believe that banks should pay significant attention to the way they decide to add conservatism to this important parameter. Approaches to estimate downturn LGD that are not conservative enough will be rejected by the supervisory authorities. Approaches that are over-conservative will have a significant negative impact on bank's capital requirements and will present a competitive disadvantage for the adopting banks.
